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Abstract
The issue of appraising the transmission process through which monetary policy affects
the economy is receiving wider and increasing attention. In Europe, much of the interest
in the effects of monetary policy is arguably a reﬂection of the introduction of the single
currency: to the extent that transmission mechanism differ signiﬁcantly across euro area
countries, heterogenous responses of economic activity and prices to the policy instrument
should be expected, an occurrence whose policy implications are of major relevance. To gain
someinsightintothelikelycausesofthosedifferencesrecentstudieshaveattemptedtoidentify
and assess separately the channels of transmission of monetary policy.
This paper proposes a simple methodology to quantify separately the different parts of
the overall impulse response that are transmitted through the various mechanisms at play in
a model of the economy. It is shown that, under the maintained assumption of linearity, the
decomposition of the effects of monetary policy into a number of channels delivered by our
approach is exact (i.e., it leaves no unexplained residual). This conclusion holds regardless of
the nature of the expectation formation mechanism and the way in which policy decisions are
modelled.
Thefeatures oftheproposedapproachareillustratedwithan empiricalapplication, using
a model that features two distinct transmission channels and assumes rational expectations and
a monetary policy reaction rule. We show that our approach produces an exact decomposition
of the effects of a monetary policy shock. Moreover, and perhaps more interestingly, our
approach gives a deeper insight than do standard impulse responses into the speciﬁc features
of the model that are most relevant in shaping its observed reaction to the shock.
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The issue of appraising the transmission process through which monetary policy affects
the economy is receiving wider and increasing attention – as testiﬁed by the number of
papers recently written on the subject – suggesting that, while nearly as old an issue as
macroeconomics itself, the effects of monetary policy on the economy are far from being
fully understood. For instance, how far the differences in ﬁnancial structure and sectoral
composition can go in explaining the differences in the transmission mechanisms across
countries is a question on which full light has not yet been shed.
In Europe, much of the interest in the effects of monetary policy on output and inﬂation
is arguably a reﬂection of the introduction of the single currency in January 1999. Indeed,
to the extent that signiﬁcant differences persist among the economies of the euro area, the
single monetary policy instrument may induce heterogenous responses of economic activity
and prices across countries. It is thus of the utmost importance to identify any such differences
and to detect the features of the economy that may account for those differences. To this end it
may be helpful to identify the various channels of transmission through which monetary policy
exerts its inﬂuence on demand, output and prices, and to quantify the empirical relevance
of those channels in the euro area economies. The transmission channels that the literature
assumes to be of relevance are typically a sub-set of the following:






G. holdings of real money balances.
In this paper we present a simple approach to decompose the overall response of an
estimated (or calibrated) model to a shock into the contributions associated with a number
1 Helpful comments by the participants in the workshop “Macroeconomic Modelling Advances”, ECB,
Frankfurt, July 2001, and in the 7th Annual Conference of the Society for Computation Economics, Yale, June
2001 are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.10
of distinct channels in such a way that the sum of those contributions leaves no unexplained
residual. We consider a general linear model featuring simultaneity and dynamics and allow
for the possibility that expectations are forward-looking and policy responds to the state of
the economy (past, current or expected). While we explicitly consider the case of a monetary
policy shock, it will be clear from the discussion that our approach can be used to decompose
the effects of shocks of a different nature as well.
Our approach builds on, and further develops, a proposal originally put forward by
Mauskopf and Siviero (1994) and extensively used in BIS (1995) and van Els et al. (2001),
collecting the empirical analyses conducted by a number of central banks using a wide range
of models. The proposal presented in Mauskopf and Siviero (1994) was not formally proved
to deliver an exact decomposition of the effects of a shock and was only shown to work in
t h ec a s eo fas p e c i ﬁc linear, backward-looking model with no policy reaction function. A few
questions thus naturally arise, namely what are the properties of the approach and whether
it remains reliable if any of the conditions underlying the example in Mauskopf and Siviero
(1994) are violated.
We ﬁrst re-examine the basic case
2 and show that the concern raised by some authors,
i.e. that simultaneity would prevent the decomposition from being accurate, is not justiﬁed, in
that the approach is guaranteed to result in a zero discrepancy between the overall effect and
the sum of the effects that are associated with the various channels of transmission. This is no
longer true, unsurprisingly, if the assumption of linearity is relaxed but still holds whatever the
assumptions concerning expectations formation and the monetary policy rule.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the issue and introduce
some notation. Section 3 brieﬂy reviews the results in Mauskopf and Siviero (1994), showing
that, with a backward-looking model and no state-contingent policy, the overall effect of a
monetary shock can be easily decomposed into channels using a set of appropriately designed
simulations. In each of these simulations the monetary policy shock is only allowed to transit
through one single channel; however, the proposed approach is so designed that the full
simultaneous structure of the model is retained in each simulation. With a linear model,
the decomposition is exact and the sum of the effects that transit through each individual
2 The basic case refers to a model which is linear, backward-looking and with no in-built policy reaction
function built in.11
transmission channel exactly equals the overall effect. Sections 4 and 5 show that the accuracy
of the decomposition does not in any way depend upon the assumptions one makes concerning
the policy reaction function and the mechanism of expectations formation. More speciﬁcally,
Section 4 tackles the issues that arise if the model also includes a monetary policy rule
(so that a monetary policy shock no longer corresponds to a shock to the policy rate but
rather to its discretionary component, i.e., to the error term in the policy rule). In this
case an exact decomposition is, apparently, no longer possible: if the approach described
in Section 3 is used “as is”, then one is left with an unexplained residual. Intuitively, it
is so because in this case one is effectively shocking only the discretionary component of
monetary policy; however, the approach described in Section 3 cannot distinguish between
the discretionary and the endogenous components. The solution to this problem is in fact
rather straightforward. The results are independent of whether the policy rule is of a purely
backward-looking nature or may depend on contemporaneous variables as well. Section 5
considers the case of forward-looking (or, more precisely, model-consistent) expectations. The
approach of Mauskopf-Siviero (1994) is shown to work accurately even in this case provided
that the maintained assumption of linearity holds. Section 6 presents an empirical application:
the approach proposed in Sections 3-5 is used to decompose the effects of a monetary policy
shock in a small-size, forward-looking model of the US economy. The model, proposed in
Ireland (2000), allows real money balances to have a direct impact on both aggregate demand
and supply and hence includes a second channel, in addition to the interest rate effect on
consumer spending, through which monetary policy impulses are transmitted. In line with
the theoretical results in the paper, we ﬁnd that, in the linearised version of the model, an
exact decomposition is feasible and show that the separate identiﬁcation of the interest rate
and money channels contributes to highlight relevant aspects of the transmission mechanism
which are usually sidestepped. The effects of non linearities are brieﬂyt a c k l e di nS e c t i o n
7. Rather unsurprisingly, as soon as the assumption of linearity is dropped, all the clear-cut
conclusions reached in the preceding sections collapse. We argue, however, that the approach
is likely to remain reliable for most practical purposes, and sketch a few ways to cope with
non linearity. Section 8 concludes.12
2. The issue and some notation
Let us assume that an empirical model (either estimated or calibrated) is used in order
to appraise the effects of monetary policy on the economy; let us further assume that a
separate quantiﬁcation of the effects that are transmitted through each individual channel is
also sought.
3
Our assumptions regarding the model are very general in that we allow for the existence
of interactions among the various channels (i.e., simultaneity),
4 as well as for both backward-
and forward-looking expectation formation mechanisms; in addition, the model may or may
not include a monetary policy reaction function. For the time being, we assume the model to
be linear, so that its deterministic block (to be used in simulation) may be written, without loss






















































t is an (n × 1) vector of endogenous variables;
xt is an (m × 1) vector of exogenous variables;
it is the policy interest rate (exogenous if γ
0 = γ
1 = γ
2 =0 n, ρ1 =0and ψ =0 m;
endogenous otherwise; note that, in this model, endogenous monetary policy may respond
to the past, current and future expected states of the economy or to a mixture of the three,
depending on the restrictions imposed on the policy reaction funtion);
∆t is a shock to the discretionary component of (endogenous) monetary policy;
3 Evaluating the effects of monetary policy that transit through the various transmission channels was one
of the goals of the collective exercise whose results were published in BIS (1995). Speciﬁcally, decomposing
the overall effects of monetary policy into the individual contributions of a number of transmission channels was
meant to cast light on the issue of identifying the structural determinants of the differences in the timing and
intensity with which output and prices react to a monetary policy shock in a number of countries. Speciﬁcally,
the BIS (1995) study sought to identify the linkages between the ﬁnancial structures in the various countries and
the corresponding pattern of responses of GDP and prices to a change in the policy interest rate. For a similar
approach see also the more recent empirical results reported in van Els et al. (2001).
4 This feature is worth emphasising; our ﬁndings below imply that the accuracy of the decomposition of the
transmission channels is in no way hampered by simultaneity.13
the superscript e denotes expectations; i.e., ze
t+j = E(zt+j|Ωt−k),w h e r eΩt−k is the
information set as of time t − k,k ≥ 0;
A0, A1 and A2 are (n × n) matrices of (estimated or calibrated) parameters;
Φ is an (n × m) matrix of parameters;




2 are (n × 1) vectors of parameters, denoting the direct impact of the policy




2 are (1 × n) vectors of parameters in the monetary policy reaction function,
describing how policy responds to the state of the economy;
ρ1 is the autoregressive parameter in the monetary policy reaction function.
To clarify the focus of the paper, let us ﬁrst address the case in which no policy reaction
function is postulated so that γ
0 = γ
1 = γ
2 =0 n, ρ1 =0and ψ =0 m; let us further
assume that there are no forward-looking expectations in the model so that, in addition to the
restrictions above, A2 =[ 0 ]and β





1it−1 + Φxt =0 (2)















t−1 + π1it + π2it−1 + Π3xt
where: Π0 is an (n × n) matrix, π1 and π2 are (n × 1) vectors and Π3 is an (n × n) matrix.
The overall effects of monetary policy on the macroeconomy may be computed easily












= Π0(Π0π1 + π2)
...14
The issue we tackle in this paper is: can the empirical relevance of the monetary policy
transmission channels be separately quantiﬁed in such a way that the sum of the channels’
individual contributions matches the overall effect of monetary policy on the economy?
Isolating the direct effects only does not, in general, fulﬁl the requirement that the sum
of individual effects matches the overall effect (for instance π1 6= β
0, unless A0 = I).
The experiments in Mauskopf (1990) did not stop at considering the sole direct effects.
The approach consisted in identifying a set of sub-blocks in the Fed’s MPS model, designed in
such a way that each of them included just one transmission mechanism of monetary policy,
possibly with a number of feedbacks; the sub-blocks were chosen in such a way that the
mechanisms activated by the various channels did not interfere with each other; the sub-
blocks were then simulated one at a time. While allowing for the possibility of within-block
simultaneity, that approach neglected by design any simultaneous interactions among sub-
blocks. As a result, one was left with an unexplained residual, being the difference between
the overall effect and the sum of the effects associated with all the individual channels.
The fact that the sum of individual effects does not match the overall effect of a monetary
policy shock on the economy might not represent such a serious drawback if it were the
case that one could still correctly estimate the relative size of the effects associated with the
various channels. Unfortunately, that approach (referred to below as the “isolated sub-blocks”
approach below) will in general result in a wrong ranking of the channels of transmission of
monetary policy (see Sections 3 and 6 below). Indeed, for some of the experiments presented
in BIS (1995) (see also Mauskopf-Siviero (1994)) the approach just described resulted in an
incorrect ranking of the various channels.
An approach designed to decompose the overall effects in such a way as to leave no
unexplained residuals (provided that one uses a linear model) was proposed in Mauskopf-
Siviero (1994). That approach may be brieﬂy described as follows:
(i) identify all channels whose empirical relevance is to be quantiﬁed; let us assume
that n separate channels are identiﬁed (i.e., as many as the total number of equations in the
model);
5
5 The possibility that there are fewer channels than the number of endogenous variables in the model can be
easily dealt with (see the next footnote). The simpliﬁed description given in the text ignores the possibility that
the point at which the various channels separate does not correspond to a “point of entry” of the policy variable15
(ii) for each channel, introduce a dummy variable with values 0 or 1 (“ﬂag” variables).
There will then be as many ﬂag variables as the number of channels. The ﬂag variable
associated with channel j will be set equal to 1 only in the simulation aimed at isolating the
effects that transit through the j-th channel; it will be set equal to 0 in all other simulations;
(iii) replace the policy variable, wherever it appears in the model, with an expression
given by the sum of two components: (i) the shocked policy variable, multiplied by the
corresponding ﬂag variable; (ii) the baseline policy variable, multiplied by one minus the ﬂag
variable;
(iv) run n simulations; in each of them only one ﬂag variable is equal to 1,w h e r e a sa l l
others aresetto zero. Hence, theendogenousvariablesareleftfreetointeract in allsimulations
so thatsimultaneity is fully taken into account; however, each endogenous variablecandirectly
respond to the policy shock only in the simulation in which the corresponding ﬂag variable is
active.
The approach described above amounts to simulating n times the following modiﬁed


















t−1 +( 1 − fj) · i
B
t−1)+Φxt
where each ﬂag fj is a scalar with fj = 1 only in the simulation aimed at quantifying the
effects of the j-th channel, whereas it is zero otherwise;
6 the superscript S identiﬁes shocked
values of the policy instrument; the superscript B identiﬁes baseline values of the latter.
in the model. One may think, for instance, of the following case: the policy interest rate only enters the long-
term interest rate equation; long-term rates affect the economy through several distinct channels. The approach
sketchily described in the text does not take such a possibility into account. Such an occurrence may, however,
be easily dealt with (it does not differ from the case of an endogenously generated policy instrument; see below).
6 Obviously, several “points of entry” of the policy interest rate may belong to the same channel of transmis-
sion(onemaythink, forinstance, ofamodelinwhichanumberofdifferentinvestment componentsareseparately
modelled in distinct equations: the effects that transit through those components should all be attributed to the
same channel, i.e., the “cost of capital” channel). Thus, the number of channels may be substantially lower than
n, in which case the various ﬂags flJ will be given by the (mutually exclusive) unions of a set of “elementary”
ﬂags fj.16

















t−1 +( In − Fj) · i
B
t−1)+Φxt
where Fj is now an (n × n) matrix, with Fj(k,l)=1 if k = l = j, Fj(k,l)=0otherwise;
clearly,
Pn
j=1 Fj = In; B0 and B1 are (n × n) matrices, having the elements of the vectors
β
0 and β
1 respectively along their main diagonals, i.e., Bj = diag[β
j]; iS
t and iB
t are (n × 1)
vectors, whose elements are identically equal to iS
t and iB
t respectively, i.e., iJ
t = 1 · iJ
t ,w h e r e
1 is an (n × 1) vector of 1’s.
Mauskopf-Siviero (1994) proposed the approach oulined above, suggesting that it
provides an exact decomposition (i.e., it results in a zero unexplained residual) of the overall
effects of monetary policy on the economy (under the assumption that the model is linear),
but did not formally prove that claim (although it was shown to hold in a case of a small,
simple model). Jahnke-Reimer (1995) argued that simultaneity would prevent that approach
from providing an exact decomposition:“...it is, admittedly, a disadvantage in this approach
that in interdependent models the sum of the partial effects does not necessarily result in the
overall effect...”. Similarly, Boeschoten-van Els (1995) expressed the fear that, “...due to the
interaction between different channels, the decomposed contributions do not necessarily add
up to the simulated total effect.” Sgherri (1999) suggested that the approach described above
would not be appropriate if expectations were forward-looking, stating that, while “with linear
backward-looking macroeconomic models the decomposition of a simulation into contributing
channels is unique and independent of the order in which the decomposition is carried out, this
is not true [...] when the expectations formation is explicitly forward-looking.” It is worth
remarking that not only the model in Sgherri (1999) is forward-looking, but it also allows for
the monetary authority to react to the state of the economy.
In the following sections we tackle these issues in turn.
3. The linear backward-looking case
The linear backward-looking case can be dealt with straightforwardly.17










B1(Fj · it−1)+Φxt =0 (7)
For each individual channel j its effect can be quantiﬁed by setting, in the corresponding ﬂag
matrix Fj, Fj(j,j)=1, while setting all other elements, as well as all those of any other ﬂag
matrix, equal to zero. Model (7) may thus be thought of as the sum of n different models, one
for each individual channel. For the j-th model, corresponding to the j-th channel, we may




t−1 + Π1Fjit + Π2Fjit−1 + Π3xt (8)
where Π0 and Π3 are the same matrices as deﬁned above and Π1 and Π2 are (n × n) matrices,
whose deﬁnition is obvious.
















=[ Π0(Π0Π1Fj + Π2Fj)] · 1
...
Hence, the sum of all individual (impact and interim) multipliers associated with the different










Π1Fj · 1 = Π1 · (
n X
j=1




















Π0(Π0Π1Fj · 1 + Π2Fj · 1)=Π0(Π0π1 + π2)
...18
since, with π1 and π2 deﬁned as in the previous section, Πj · 1 = πj, j = 1,2.
Therefore, the sum of the effects that transit through the individual channels exactly
matches the overall effect that can be estimated from the reduced form of the whole model
(compare the expressions above with those provided in Section 2). Hence, at least in the
case of a linear backward-looking model with no policy reaction function, simultaneity does
not prevent the “ﬂag approach” from delivering an accurate decomposition of the impact of
monetary policy on the economy.
One may easily build examples in which the “isolated sub-block” approach described
earlier would deliver a wrong ranking of the effects associated with the various channels.
















w h e r ew ea s s u m ea12,a 21 < 1.













Following the “isolated sub-blocks” approach (given that this model has only two channels,


























As expected, the two effects do not, in general, sum to the total (eq. (12)).



























In this case, the sum of the effects associated with the two channels matches the total.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that the two approaches deliver the same ranking of the
transmission channels unless some conditions are satisﬁed (more generally, the relative size19
of the effects would probably be wrongly estimated by the isolated sub-block approach). If
−a12b2 >b 1 > 0 (so that the ﬂag approach indicates that “channel 2” is quantitatively more
relevant than ”channel 1” as far as the effects on y1t are concerned) the isolated sub-block
approach would result in a reverse ranking of the two channels. In BIS (1995) and Mauskopf-
Siviero (1994), several simulation experiments do indeed show that incorrect ranking of
the transmission channels is by no means an exception but, on the contrary, tends to occur
frequently in empirical applications.
4. Dealing with policy reaction functions
Let us now consider a model that includes a policy reaction function. For simplicity, let
us for the time being ignore the possibility of forward-looking expectations. Hence, the model






































































where B0, B1, it and it−1 are deﬁned as in Section 2, Γj =[ γ0
j|...|γ0
j]0, j =0 ,1,i sa n(n × n)
matrix, P1 = ρ1In, Ψ =[ ψ
0|...|ψ
0]0 is an (n × m) matrix, ∆t =[ ∆t,...,∆t]0 is an (n × 1)
vector.











































Let us consider, for the time being, the impact multiplier (i.e., the immediate reaction of the
economy to a change in the discretionary component of monetary policy); using the result for






0 B0(In − Γ0A
−1
0 B0)
−1 · 1 (18)20
where 1 is an (n × 1) vector of 1’s.
It may be easily checked that the system of ﬂags described in Section 3 above does not
work if used “as is”. If the ﬂag matrices are used to include or to “include out” (as Sam
Goldwyn would put it) the direct impact of the policy instrument it on the various endogenous
variables, then the sum of the effects associated with the various channels will not match the
overall effect. To see this, let there be n ﬂag matrices Fj deﬁn e da si nS e c t i o n2 ;l e tu sn o w
apply the ﬂag matrices to the Bj’s matrices (as in Section 2) to get a collection of n models,









































0 B0Fj(In − Γ0A
−1
0 B0Fj)
−1 · 1 (20)












0 B0Fj · (In − Γ0A
−1
0 B0Fj)
−1 · 1] (21)
will, in general, differ from the overall effect, hence leaving an unexplained residual; this is
so because of the non-linear transformation implied by the inversion, for each channel, of a
different (function of the) corresponding simultaneous block.
If Γ0 =[ 0 ]but Γ1 6=[ 0 ](i.e., the policy reaction function is purely backward-looking),
then the impact multiplier would still be exactly decomposable; however, the decomposition
would turn out to be inaccurate as soon as the multipliers at the following periods were
considered. It may also be easily checked that if Γ0 = Γ1 =[ 0 ](which amounts to assuming
no state-contingent policy reaction function, i.e., the same model as in Section 3), eq. (21) is
the same as eq. (18) (i.e., the decomposition would be accurate).
7 As anticipated in a previous footnote, a model that includes a policy reaction function is a special case of
a model in which the transmission channels do not separate at a “point of entry” of the policy variable. In eq.
(15) in the text, simply deﬁne ∆t to be the policy interest rate and it to be the long-term interest rate, so that the
last equation in the model is no longer to be interpreted as the monetary policy reaction function, but rather as
a term-structure equation. This means that the transmission channels become separately identiﬁed only at some
point iside the simultaneous block of the model. Thus, the approach outlined in this section is also appropriate in
the case of a model in which the transmission channels do no separate at a “point of entry” of the policy variable.21
The remark above suggests that the problem with using the ﬂa g si nt h es a m ew a ya s
outlined in Sections 2 and 3 rests precisely with the presence of a policy reaction function: as
soon as the latter comes into play (with a backward-looking policy rule this happens in period
2) the approach collapses.
In the light of these remarks, one’s intuition is that the source of trouble lies in the
nature of the shock. Speciﬁcally, in this case the overall effect measures the consequences
of a shock to the discretionary component of the policy variable only. On the contrary, the
approach outlined earlier in this section is such that, when a channel is alternatively included
or excluded from the model, both the discretionary component of policy and the response
implied by the presence of a policy reaction function are jointly either included or excluded.I t
is rather obvious that this cannot be a promising approach.
The foregoing discussion suggests the following intuitive and simple solution: given
that the genuine exogenous variable whose effects are to be separately attributed to the various
transmission channels is now ∆t rather than it, it is natural to apply the system of ﬂags to ∆t








































where Fj is deﬁned in the usual way.
Each model j may be used to quantify the multipliers associated with the j-th channel;







0 B0(In − Γ0A
−1
0 B0)
−1Fj · 1, j = 1,...,n (23)















Fj) · 1 (24)
= A
−1
0 B0(In − Γ0A
−1
0 B0)
−1 · 1 (25)22
exactly matches the overall effect (see eq. (18)). Tedious algebra shows that the equality holds
for all interim multipliers.
To summarize the results so far, whether or not the (linear) model one is using
includes a monetary policy reaction function, a proper approach may be designed that exactly
decomposes the overall effects into a number of transmission channels.
5. The linear forward-looking case
Let us now maintain the assumption that monetary policy impulses are measured by the
discretionary component of the reaction function, but relax the restriction that the model does
not include forward-looking expectations





t+1 + Dxt (26)
where A and D are respectively an n×n and an n×m matrix; the n×1 vector y
t now includes
the policy instrument as well. While the model above may at ﬁrst appear to be overly simple, it
is in fact quite general. To close the model it is then necessary to assume a generating process
for the exogenous variables. The most general hypothesis is that xt =
∞ P
j=0
Θjεt−j,w h e r eεt
is an innovation process and
∞ P
j=0
|Θj| < ∞ to ensure that the process is stationary. Following
Taylor (1986), the solution may be found by using the method of undetermined coefﬁcients,
whichamounts to assumingfor y
t anunrestrictedlinearprocess, similartotheone assumedfor
xt and to solving for the unknown parameters by imposing that the assumed process solves the
vector system (26). In this way, the problem of solving a stochastic difference vector equation
with conditional expectations of future variables is converted into a problem of solving a





and, for the sake of simplicity, let us in addition assume that Θj = Θj so as to ensure that
it is possible to obtain a solution in closed form. In the general case in which no linear
combination of the exogenous variables is a degenerate stochastic process the matrix Θ is


















Γj = AΓj+1 + DΘj j =0 ,1,2,... (28)
This is a standard deterministic ﬁrst-order difference equation, whose general solution is





j=0 and the particular





j=0. It is worth stressing that the model as such
is undetermined: for j =0there are 2n2 unknowns and only n2 equations. The necessary
additional restrictions are to be found by appealing to initial conditions
8 and by requiring that
the solution be stationary and unique.





j=0 is to assume
that ΓP
j = ΞΘj,w i t hΞ to be determined so as to satisfy eq. (28) for each value of j.F o rj =0
eq. (28) requires that Ξ − AΞΘ = D and the elements of Ξ c a nb er e c o v e r e db yt h er e l a t i o n
vec(Ξ)=( I − Θ0 ⊗ A)
−1 vec(D). It is worth stressing that the existence of a solution for
the matrix Ξ does not hinge on the invertibility of the matrix A: all is required is that the
eigenvalues of the two matrices Θ and A do not come in reciprocal pairs.






is more easily found by focusing on one column at a time:
γj = Aγj+1, (30)
where γj is any one of the column vectors in ΓH
j . In a given application, some elements of the
vector γ0,v i z .k, will be known: these are restrictions that can be generally derived from the
initial conditions for the predetemined variables. To get a unique solution we therefore need
n − k additional equations. These additional restrictions can be obtained by requiring that the
solution for yt be stationary. If there are exactly n − k distinct roots of A which are smaller
8 The relationship between initial and terminal conditions, the number of stable and unstable roots, and
the constraints which are needed to determine the solution of the system of difference equations providing the
undetermined coefﬁcients will be made clear by means of an example.24
than one in modulus, then the saddle point manifold will give the precise number of additional
restrictions which are necessary for a unique solution.
9
Under the assumption that the matrix A is non-singular,
10 that it can be diagonalized and
that the system is ordered in such a way that the unstable roots come ﬁrst, then (30) can be
written as follows:
γj = H−1ΛHγj+1 ⇐⇒ Hγj+1 = Λ−1Hγj (31)
where H and Λ are respectively the matrix of eigenvectors and eigenvalues of A. Partitioning




























where Λ1 is the diagonal matrix containing all the unstable roots. For stability we require that
H11γ1
1 + H12γ2
1 =0 .T h e s e n − k equations deﬁne the saddle point manifold and are the
additional constraints which are needed for a solution. Having solved for γ1 and the unknown






































where the matrices Γ1
j and Γ2
j are obtained by collecting the n vectors γ1
j and γ2
j respectively.









Γjεt−j identically satisﬁes (26), the interim




Notice that the matrix D which premultiplies the exogenous variables (and hence the monetary
9 The classical reference for this claim is Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
10 This is by no means an irrelevant assumption. In most cases, for instance when the system (26) has a
recursive structure or when the model accommodates expectations taken at different points in time, the reverse is
true. This assumption is made for the sake of simplicity and will be dropped in the sequel.25
shock as well) enters the particular solution linearly. Since the matrix Γk ≡ ΓH
k + ΞΘk is a
linear function of D for any k, the channel decomposition by means of the ﬂag method also
preserves the additivity property for models with forward looking variables.
Closed-form solutions are not available for the more general case Θj 6= Θj b u ti ts t i l l
holds true that the matrices Γj and Θj are linked by a linear relationship, as equation (28)
clearly indicates.
The above demonstration relies on the invertibility of the matrix A, which turns out to be
quite a restrictive assumption. The more general linear case, with unconstrained lag and lead










may always be transformed
11, provided that the state vector is properly deﬁned, into a





In general, the matrix A1 is non-invertible and non-diagonalizable and the procedure outlined
above to ﬁnd the solution for y
t must be modiﬁed. Either the Jordan factorization or
the generalized Schur decomposition must be used and equation (32) must be changed
accordingly, allowing respectively for a block diagonal or a block upper triangular Λ matrix.
A bivariate example will help clarify how the recipe actually works. Let us assume that
the model to be solved, which satisﬁes the saddle path property, is the following:
z1t = A1Etz1t+1 + A2z2t + A3z2t−1 + δ1xt
z2t = B1Etz1t+1 + B2z1t + B3z2t−1 + δ2xt
wherethen−k×1vectorz1t collectsthesetofforwardlookingvariables, whilethek×1vector


























¢0. By inverting the matrix on the left-hand side the above expression
































εt−2 + .... .
Under the assumption that xt =
∞ P
j=0
Θjεt−j, substitution of the tentative solution for y
t and
of the generating process for the exogenous variables into equation (26) provides the set of
restrictions:
Γj = AΓj+1 + DΘj . (35)
Focusing on the case j =0 , that is on the matrix equation Γ0 = AΓ1 + DΘ0,i ti se a s yt o
s e et h a ti ti n c l u d e s2n2 unknowns, namely the elements Γ0 and Γ1, and only n2 restrictions,
so that n2 additional conditions are needed. nk of them are provided by the zeros in the lower
block of the matrix Γ0, which corresponds to the set of predetermined variables. Considering
the homogeneous counterpart of (35) in the case of j = 1, the stability requirement for the
solution implies that Γ11 = −H
−1
11 H12Γ20, as shown in (33). These constraints provide the
missing n(n − k) restrictions which allow the remaining elements of the matrices Γ0 and











6. An empirical illustration
In this section we provide an example of the approach outlined above using the model
presented in Ireland (2000); the model includes two distinct monetary policy transmission
channels: (i) a traditional direct effect of the real interest rate on output (hereafter, IS channel);
(ii) an indirect effect that transits through real money balances (hereafter, RB channel). Money
holdings enter both the IS equation and the Phillips curve because households’ utility function
is assumed non-separable across consumption and real balances: this feature gives additional27
leverage to monetary policy actions, which can manipulate liquidity holdings by changing the
opportunity cost of idle money.
For our purposes, a detailed discussion of Ireland’s (2000) model is not necessary.
Sufﬁce it to say that the equilibrium values of output and inﬂation are obtained by solving
the system composed of the IS and Phillips curve, while real money balances are post-
recursively determined through a money demand equation. Monetary policy is modelled as
a Taylor-type rule, augmented with nominal money growth. The model is driven by four
exogenous processes: total factor productivity, a disturbance to the monetary policy rule
and two preference shocks, which translate, in equilibrium, into disturbances to the IS and
money demand curves. The linearized ﬁrst order conditions result in the following set of eight
equations in eight endogenous variables:
yt = Etyt+1 − ω1(rt − Etπt+1) (36)
+ω2[(mt − et) − (Etmt+1 − Etet+1)] + ω1(at − Etat+1)
mt = γ1yt − γ2rt + γ3et (37)
πt =( π/r)Etπt+1 + ψ[(1/ω1)yt − (ω2/ω1)(mt − et) − zt] (38)
rt = ρyyt + ρππt + ρµµt + εrt (39)
µt = mt − mt−1 + πt (40)
at = ρaat−1 + εat (41)
et = ρeet−1 + εet (42)
zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt (43)
Allvariablesareexpressedasdeviations fromtheirsteady-statevalues; at and et arepreference
shocks, zt represents productivity, yt is output, mt is real money balances, πt is the inﬂation
rate, rt is the policy interest rate and µt is money growth. The model is estimated by maximum
likelihood using US data from 1980.Q1 to 1999.Q2 and matches satisfactorily the vector
autocorrelation function of the data.
The unconstrained estimate of the elasticity of the output gap and inﬂa t i o nt or e a l
balances turns out to be negligible. ω2 is actually negative, although not statistically
signiﬁcant: neither a Wald nor a likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that real
balances fail to enter the IS and Phillips curves. Ireland interprets this outcome as supporting28
the minimal treatment of money in the new vintage of micro-funded monetary models of
the type popularized by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Ireland also presents a set of
constrained estimates, in which ω2 is restricted to be positive, but the ﬁt of the model
deteriorates signiﬁcantly and the overall properties of the system do not change signiﬁcantly,
which reinforces the claim that money’s role in the monetary business cycle is limited.
12 Our
decomposition of the overall effects of monetary policy suggests that that conclusion is not
entirely warranted, although for reasons that might be unexpected a priori.
To apply the approach proposed in this paper to the model in Ireland (2000) we need to
modify the original model as follow:
yt = Etyt+1 − ω1(rIS
t − Etπt+1)
+ ω2[(mt − et) − (Etmt+1 − Etet+1)] + ω1(at − Etat+1) (44)
mt = γ1yt − γ2rRB
t + γ3et (45)
πt =( π/r)Etπt+1 + ψ[(1/ω1)yt − (ω2/ω1)(mt − et) − zt] (46)
rIS
t = ρyyt + ρππt + ρµµt + f1εrt (47)
rRB
t = ρyyt + ρππt + ρµµt + f2εrt (48)
µt = mt − mt−1 + πt (49)
at = ρaat−1 + εat (50)
et = ρeet−1 + εet (51)
zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt (52)
Clearly, if f1 and f2 are both 1, one recovers the same overall effects as with the original
model. With f1 = 1 and f2 =0one recovers the effects (both direct and indirect) that transit
through the impact of the policy rate on the IS curve (IS channel); ﬁnally, with f1 =0and
f2 = 1 one recovers the effects (both direct and indirect) that transit through the impact of the
policy rate on the money demand equation (RB channel).
The experimental design is as follows: we give a unit shock to the discretionary
component of the policy interest rate for one period, setting both ﬂags equal to 1, so as
to recover the overall effect. To solve the model we use the rational expectation algorithm
proposed by Binder and Pesaran (1996). The overall responses of inﬂation, output and real
12 The constrained and unconstrained estimated values of all the parameters in the model are shown in Table
1.29
money balances for the constrained model are reported in Figures 1-3 (solid lines). Figures
4-5 show the reaction of the policy variable (rRB
t and rIS
t ; the overall reaction is obviously
identical for both variables).
Next, we alternatively set the two ﬂags in the augmented model to either 0 or 1. Setting
the ﬁrst ﬂag equal to 1 and the second equal to 0, one estimates the effects that transit through
the IS channel. With the opposite ﬂag setting one recovers the effects that transit through
the real money balances channel. The two effects are shown in Figures 1-5 (speciﬁcally, the
dashed line is the response that transits through the IS channel, while the dotted line is the
response through the RB channel). They can be seen to sum up exactly to the overall effect for
all variables.
Inthesimulation aimedatisolatingtheeffectsthattransitthrough theRBchannel(dotted
line), one of the most prominent features is the sharp fall in real money balances. This fall
largely offsets the initial shock to the policy interest rate (see, for example, the response of the
interest rate through the RB channel in Figure 4) and mitigates the negative response of output
to the policy tightening.
The decomposition exercise highlights a number of interesting and to some extent
unexpected features of the model. First, the RB channel is quantitatively much more relevant
than the IS channel in determining the overall response of the economy to the shock, which
would lead one to conclude that the role of money is far from limited. Second, the RB channel
is the main source of persistence in the model; by contrast, the effects that are transmitted by
the IS channel tend to die out very quickly. Indeed, if one takes a closer look at the model in
the light of the remark above, one does not fail to realize that the only source of dynamics in
the model is the response of the policy rate to nominal money growth.
Figures 6-10 report the results obtained with the unconstrained version of Ireland’s
(2000) model. The results show that real money balances do still matter, even if the coefﬁcient
ω2 is small, insigniﬁcant and actually has the wrong sign. The reason why the model is still
very reactive to monetary policy is that the monetary policy rule is highly sensitive to money
growth. Actually, the main reason why the overall response is smaller than the one associated
w i t ht h ec o n s t r a i n e dm o d e lh a ss c a r c e l ya n y t h i n gt od ow i t ht h eω2 parameter; rather, it reﬂects
the fact that the estimate of the ω1 parameter – i.e., the parameter that identiﬁes the traditional
IS effect – is now much smaller than before.30
The experiment documented in this section is only meant to show that the approach
proposed in this paper delivers an accurate decomposition of the overall effects of monetary
policy on the economy even if expectations are forward-looking and monetary policy responds
to the state of the economy.
However, our results suggest that this approach may provide useful insights into the
propagation mechanisms of a shock, and hence may be of help in better understanding the
structureand featuresofamodel. Speciﬁcally, inboththeconstrainedaunconstrained versions
of Ireland’s (2000) model, the real money balances channel is by far the quantitatively most
relevant channel in shaping the overall results, despite the fact that the sign of the direct
effect of real money balances on output (through the IS curve) is exactly the opposite in
the two versions of the model (being negative, i.e., of the wrong sign, in the unconstrained
version). This is so because the estimated parameters imply a high sensitivity of nominal
money balances to the interest rate and, most importantly, the latter responds to the rate
of growth of money, given the speciﬁcation of the monetary reaction function. The latter
thus stands out as a key feature of the model in that it plays a very prominent role (possibly
unexpected a priori) in shaping the overall results.

















Figure 1 - Unconstr. - Solid: total effect; dashed: IS ch.; dotted: RB ch..
Figure 2 - Unconstr. - Solid: total effect; dashed: IS ch.; dotted: RB ch..32
Figure 3 - Unconstr. - Solid: total effect; dashed: IS ch.; dotted: RB ch..
Figure 4 - Unconstr. - Solid: total effect; dashed: IS ch.; dotted: RB ch..33
Figure 5 - Unconstr. - Solid: total effect; dashed: IS ch.; dotted: RB ch..
Figure 6 - Constr. - Solid: total effect; dashed: IS ch.; dotted: RB ch..34
Figure 7 - Constr. - Solid: total effect; dashed: IS ch.; dotted: RB ch..
Figure 8 - Constr. - Solid: total effect; dashed: IS ch.; dotted: RB ch..35
Figure 9 - Constr. - Solid: total effect; dashed: IS ch.; dotted: RB ch..
Figure 10 - Constr. - Solid: total effect; dashed: IS ch.; dotted: RB ch..
7. Non linearity
As soon as one leaves the linear world, the clear-cut conclusions reached in the previous
sections all tend to collapse, as in fact one would expect a priori: speciﬁcally, for any given
shock to the policy variable it will in general no longer be true that the sum of the partial
channel-speciﬁc reactions of the endogenous variables to the shock matches the total reaction.36
The accuracy of the decomposition will tend to deteriorate as the size of the shock increases;
for an inﬁnitely small shock the decomposition will still be accurate. Moreover, if the model
is non linear it does matter how the effects of a shock are computed. By contrast, in the linear
case the results are unaffected by the sequence in which they are evaluated.
Although non linearity seems at ﬁrst to be an unpromising case, a few qualiﬁcations can
still be made.
First, it is usually the case that the degree of non linearity of most macroeconometric
models is very limited (as measured, for example, by the size of the deterministic bias; see the
extensive results reported in Fisher and Salmon (1986)). Second, for a small enough shock an
accurate decomposition is still possible, as mentioned. Third, one may somehow check for the
effects of nonlinearity deriving a measure of its relevance. One way this may be done is by
changing the sequence in which the effects of the various channels are measured. For instance,
the effects that transit through each channel may be evaluated in two different ways, namely by
adopting either a bottom-up or a top-down approach. In the ﬁrst case, the size of the channel
is computed by means of a single simulation in which the ﬂag identifying the channel is set
equal to 1 while all the others are set to 0; in the second case, it is computed indirectly as the
difference between the overall effect and the one attributable to the other channel. This way of
proceeding will result in an interval, rather than a point value, for the effects associated with
each channel. The width of the interval may be viewed as providing a measure of the degree
of non linearity of the model, as an alternative to the standard deterministic bias.
To illustrate these remarks let us consider again the model used in the previous section.
The model was modiﬁed by arbitrarily introducing an exponential function for the impact of
the policy rate on money balances (the exponential function was calibrated to give the same
baseline solution as the original model). The overall effect on inﬂation of a shock to the
discretionary component of monetary policy is shown in Figure 11, together with the effects
associated with each of the two channels IS and RB. Only the impact multiplier is shown in
the ﬁgure, for shock sizes between -100 and 100 basis points.
The overall multiplier is almost constant across the shock range depicted in the ﬁgure.
The same does not hold for the effects associated with each individual channel. Computing
these effects both directly and indirectly results in a range that tends to become larger as the37
(absolute) size of the shock increases. However, it may be seen that in this particular case the
two ranges are far from overlapping.
8. Conclusions
We have shown that an appropriately designed system of “ﬂags” may be used to
separately assess the empirical relevance of the various monetary policy transmission channels
atplayinan (estimatedorcalibrated)model. Theapproach is anextensionoftheoneoriginally
proposed in Mauskopf-Siviero (1994). We have shown that, contrary to the fears expressed by
a number of authors, that approach is not only well suited to deal with the vanilla case of a
backward-looking model but may also handle, with slight modiﬁcations, the case in which
expectations are forward-looking and/or a policy reaction function is postulated.
Onlynonlinearityputsastrainontheaccuracyoftheapproach. However, sucharesultis
largely expected. Moreover, the degree of non linearity of most models of the macroeconomy
is by and large rather limited. Also, ways to control for the effects of non linearity may be
designed.
The exercise presented in the paper suggests that this approach may provide useful (and,
in the speciﬁc case considered here, somewhat unexpected) insight into the features of an
empirical model.References
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